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Most accounts of organizations and law treat law as largely exoge-
nous and emphasize organizations’ responses to law. This study pro-
poses a model of endogeneity among organizations, the professions,
and legal institutions. It suggests that organizations and the profes-
sions strive to construct rational responses to law, enabled by “ratio-
nal myths” or stories about appropriate solutions that are themselves
modeled after the public legal order. Courts, in turn, recognize and
legitimate organizational structures that mimic the legal form, thus
conferring legal and market beneﬁts upon organizational structures
that began as gestures of compliance. Thus, market rationality can
follow from rationalized myths: the professions promote a particular
compliance strategy, organizations adopt this strategy to reduce
costs and symbolize compliance, and courts adjust judicial construc-
tions of fairness to include these emerging organizational practices.
To illustrate this model, a case study of equal employment opportu-
nity (EEO) grievance procedures is presented in this article.
The meaning of law regulating organizations unfolds dynamically across
organizational, professional, and legal ﬁelds. Legislative action and judi-
cial interpretation offer law its ofﬁcial stamp, but organizations—and the
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larger environmental ﬁelds in which they operate—interact with legal in-
stitutions to create ritualized ideas about what constitutes a rational re-
sponse to law. It is these ideologies of rationality—the accounts, stories,
and myths about how organizations should respond to law—rather than
the substantive law itself that ultimately determine both organizations’
strategic responses to law and the courts’ responses to organizational ac-
tions.
Law, then, should be understood more as a rhetorical and symbolic
resource than asan articulate mandate (Stryker 1990,1994). The construc-
tion of law is invariably contested: many voices contribute to the process
of legal enactment and vie for favorable interpretations of law once it is
enacted. The more ambiguous and politically contested the law, the more
open it is to social construction. Law regulating organizations is especially
open to social construction because the corporate lobby is usually success-
ful in softening regulation that infringes on corporate interests, thus pro-
ducing broad, vague mandates. Under such conditions, organizations ac-
tively participate in constructing the meaning of compliance, and this
construction process generates ideologies of rationality, which legitimate
and reinforce particular compliance strategies. That organizations are
both responding to and constructing the law that regulates them renders
law “endogenous”; the content and meaning of law is determined within
the social ﬁeld that it is designed to regulate.
In this article, we explore the evolving ideologies of rationality within
the context of equal employment opportunity (EEO) law, most notably
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which forbids discriminatory treat-
ment on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. We con-
sider in particular the interactions among organizations, the legal and per-
sonnel professions, and the courts as they construct the meaning of
compliance with EEO law. Since EEO law is a particularly ambiguous
and controversial area, the effects of ideologies of rationality on forms of
compliance are especially visible in this case. Nevertheless, since most
forms of law regulating organizations use broad language, our arguments
should be applicable to other legal areas, albeit to varying degrees.
In particular, we focus on the increasing portrayal of internal EEO
grievance procedures as a “rational” mode of compliance with EEO law.
EEO lawsimply mandatesnondiscrimination;it issilent as to thequestion
of what actions an employer might take to rebut an employee’s claim of
discrimination. Yet, grievance procedures have emerged over the past few
decades as the primary symbol of nondiscrimination and as the most ratio-
nal way for employers to insulate themselves from legal liability. We use
of Law and Society, University of California, 2240 Piedmont Avenue, Berkeley, Cali-
fornia 94720. E-mail: ledelman@uclink4.berkeley.edu
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three data sources to document the construction of ideologies of grievance
procedure rationality: (1) the professional personnel literature to examine
the claims of management, legal, and personnel professionals about griev-
ance procedures; (2) survey data to study organizational creation of the
procedures and their impact on complaints; and (3) federal court cases to
illustrate the judiciary’s construction of these procedures.
Our data suggest that the professions proffer stories about the legal
value of grievance procedures to organizations and that the stories inﬂu-
ence both organizational adoption of the procedures and legal consider-
ations by courts. These stories are based on theories that have only tenu-
ous legal foundation or greatly exaggerate the scope of court rulings.
Nonetheless, as they are told and retold in the professional journals, the
stories tend to become widely accepted in organizational ﬁelds and to in-
ﬂuence ideas about organizational rationality across organizational, pro-
fessional, and legal realms. Over time, actors in each of these realms come
to equate grievance procedures with compliance, leading to the prevalent
belief that organizations can avoid signiﬁcant legal costs by creating these
procedures.
So far, then, ours is a typically institutionalist argument. We also con-
tend, however, that organizational ideologies of rationality induce the ju-
diciary to incorporate grievance procedures into legal constructions of
compliance with EEO law. Further, because of judicial decisions that
reinforce ideologies of rationality, these procedures begin to confer tangi-
ble economic beneﬁts on organizations. Thus what may have begun as
somewhat of a stab in the dark—an educated guess modeled after the
public legal order—acquires market rationality because of processes of
institutionalization.
This article goes beyond previous analyses of organizational response
to law (Edelman 1990, 1992; Edelman, Abraham, and Erlanger 1992;
Dobbin et al. 1988; Dobbin et al. 1993; Sutton et al. 1994) in several ways.
First, whereas previous studies have focused on the institutional sources
of diffusion of legal structures,this studyseeks to specify how thediffusion
of institutional structures affects their market rationality, that is, the cost
savings to organizations. Second, whereas previous studies refer to the
effects of court decisions, we introduce courts (and to a lesser extent ad-
ministrative agencies) as important players in the production of ideologies
of rationality. Third, in contrast to institutional perspectives that do not
empirically examine their assertion that institutionalized beliefs are myth-
ical, we provide tests ofthe major claimsabout therationality of grievance
procedures that have become widely prevalent in organizational and pro-
fessional communities. Finally, we trace the development of a particular
ideology of rationality over time, which allows a stronger causal argument
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with respect to the interdependent roles of organizations, the professions,
and the judiciary.
In the next section, we review theoretical perspectives on organizational
response to law and propose a synthesis of conﬂicting views of rationality
in the institutional and more traditional rational perspectives. Then, our
argument proceeds as follows: In the section on the socially constructed
rationality of grievance procedures, we sample the professional personnel
literature toillustrate whatwe believetobeamajorsourceoftheconstruc-
tion of rationality in organizational ﬁelds: arguments that EEO grievance
procedures are a rational response to the threat of legal intervention and
that they will insulate the organization from liability for discrimination.
Using data from Edelman’s national survey of organizational response to
civil rights law, we show how these articles correspond to a dramatic in-
crease in organizations’ adoptions of internal grievance procedures.
Next, we turn to empirical analysesof theclaims spread and legitimated
by the personnel profession and show that those “rational myths” have
little basis in fact, at least when they are ﬁrst introduced. In the section
on the myth of grievance procedures as insulators, we use data from the
national survey of organizations to refute the empirical claim that the use
of grievance procedures would result in fewer external complaints. Then,
in the section on the myth of judicial deferral to grievance procedures,
we show that the law in effect at the time the early articles were written
offered little support for the claim that grievance procedures would insu-
late organizations from liability. However, we also show that over time,
as defendants in employment discrimination cases increasingly used the
grievance procedure defense, courts have become more likely to defer to
organizations’ grievance procedures and to consider them relevant to de-
terminations of liability. Thus, in our conclusion, we argue that the pro-
cess of institutionalization has started to come full circle: Even though
grievance procedures were not important in legal doctrine when the per-
sonnel profession promoted them, their signiﬁcance as evidence of fair
treatment has increasingly become an accepted part of the legal arsenal
in discrimination lawsuits, and courts are far more likely today than they
were in the past to ﬁnd organizations with EEO grievance procedures
not liable for discrimination. Our story, then, provides an example of the
reciprocal relationship between organizational behavior and legal regula-
tion.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Legal rules are not self-enforcing. When a new legal rule is announced,
those subject to it must determine what constitutes compliance and what
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actions they will take to demonstrate compliance (Edelman 1992). In ad-
dressing how organizations respond to law, two important analytic frame-
works are a market approach, which emphasizes rational adaptation to
a set of external market conditions, and an institutional approach, which
emphasizes normative cues that emanate from organizations’ environ-
ments. We suggest that these apparently oppositional explanations are to
some extent complementary and reinforcing when the endogeneity of law
is observed over time.
Market approaches emphasize organizational agency and generally
hold that economic markets reward efﬁciency and rationality in organiza-
tional structure. These theories tend to assume that efﬁciency is objec-
tively knowable and largely a product of market conditions. Because ra-
tional perspectives focus on organizations’ market behaviors, law has
played a relatively minor role in these analyses. And classical economic
approaches address EEO law but tend to view it as an impediment to
market efﬁciency (Epstein 1992; Posner 1986; Becker 1971). Two more
recent approaches emphasize organizational adaptation to the external
environment: Resource dependence theory suggests that within the con-
straints set by law, organizations will adopt structures that minimize costs
and maximize resource ﬂows (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and transaction
cost approaches view law as important in shaping the relative costs of
governance through contractual or hierarchical arrangements (William-
son 1979, 1981). In these accounts, then, law is one of many market forces
that may affect what course of action will offer the greatest ﬁnancial suc-
cess. Law is understood as an exogenous phenomenon, and organizations
are assumed to be rational actors with good information, attempting to
operate efﬁciently with respect to legal constraints.
Institutional theories challenge the notion of an objective rationality,
arguing that concepts of rationality are socially constructed by nonmarket
factors such as widely accepted norms and patterns of behavior (Meyer
and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1983; Powell and Di-
Maggio 1991). Institutional accounts derive from the phenomenological
work of Berger and Luckmann (1967) and highlight the taken-for-granted
nature of rules. Further, these accounts hold that organizational behavior
is largely given by “rational myths” or belief systems that embody stories
about cause and effect and successful solutions to problems (Meyer and
Rowan 1977; Zucker 1977, 1988). These belief systems appear rational in
that they specify in a rulelike manner what organizations must do to be
efﬁcient, but they are myths in that their efﬁcacy depends on the fact that
they are widely shared rather than inherently correct (Scott 1987). In this
view, organizations lack agency because they are shaped to such a great
extent byinstitutionalized rules. Other institutional accounts(e.g., DiMag-
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gio 1988; Powell 1985), however, and in particular institutional studies
that directly address the relation between law and organizations (e.g.,
Edelman 1990, 1992; Konrad and Linnehan 1995; Stryker 1994; see Such-
man and Edelman [1996] for a review), tend to reject the phenomenologi-
cal assumptions of the early institutionalism. These works continue to
emphasize the responsiveness of organizations to their institutional envi-
ronments but allow room for agency in the context of organizations’ at-
tempts to respond strategically to legal mandates. Sewell (1992) argues
more generally that institutionalized schema provide resources for human
agency.
The extant literature on law and organizations, then, raises the possi-
bility of agency in organizational response to law but does not specify
how institutional processes and agency might coexist. This article ela-
borates the institutional work on law and organizations by suggesting that
organizational agency and institutional processes coexist through a
process of local rationality within the context of global institutionalism:
organizations seek to act rationally in response to law—to minimize
costs and maximize resource ﬂows—but the deﬁnition of rationality is
constructed and evolves at the environmental level, driven by institution-
alized stories about the value of particular organizational structures and
actions.
There are two tenets to our argument: First, organizations seek to act
rationally but are constrained by their institutional environment. For ex-
ample, organizations adopt EEO grievance procedures in an effort to re-
duce the potential for liability, but they choose this adaptation in prefer-
ence to others because grievance procedures have acquired an aura of
fairness and efﬁcacy. Second, institutional environments inﬂuence market
rationality, that is, the social valuation of institutionalized structures af-
fects their beneﬁts to organizations. In our example, the prevalence of
grievance procedures and the arguments of professionals render courts
more likely to consider grievance procedures as reasonable steps toward
fair treatment.Thus, theadoption of institutionalizedstructures oftenpro-
vides monetary beneﬁts, as well as legitimacy, to organizations. This ap-
proach is decidedly institutional in that we see rationality as ultimately
socially constructed. But it explicitly incorporates elements of resource
dependence and transaction costs analysis by recognizing organizational
efforts to adapt strategically to their legal environments (compare Oliver
1991) and by suggesting that social constructions, when recognized by the
courts, render certain organizational behaviors objectively rational. Thus,
institutional processes work in concert with, rather than in place of, mar-
ket rationality. Over time, rational myths can become, or can at least in-
ﬂuence, market reality.
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THE SOCIALLY CONSTRUCTED RATIONALITY OF GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES
In this section, we address the construction of the rationality of EEO
grievance procedures during the ﬁrst two decades following the passage
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. During this period, organizations were con-
fronted with ambiguous legal mandates and the problem of deﬁning com-
pliance (see Edelman 1992). EEO grievance procedures gained popularity
as organizations looked to one another and to the personnel and legal
professions for rational solutions to this problem.
The Professions’ Proposal of Grievance Procedures as the Solution
Professional networks generally play an important role in the diffusion of
new forms of governance and responses to law (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings 1986; Edelman et al. 1992; Jacoby
1985; Suchman 1993) and, not surprisingly, appear to have been critical
in bringing grievance procedures into the legal consciousness of the orga-
nizational community. These networks consistof professional associations
and their conventions, commercial workshops onhow to comply with law,
professional communications on the World Wide Web, and a large num-
ber of professional personnel journals.
To examine the professional construction of the rationality of EEO
grievance procedures, we reviewed 85 articles in the business literature
from 1964 to 1989 (personnel and management journals and law journals
relevant to businesses), addressing nonunion grievance procedures in the
context of EEO law.2 The authors of these articles are mostly personnel
managers, management academics, or staff writers, although some are
lawyers. All are intended, however, for a personnel audience.3
The articles frame the rationality of grievance procedures in several
ways, which vary somewhat over time. In the late 1960s, articles that
mentioned grievance procedures tended to focus on their beneﬁts for
avoiding unions (e.g., Corzine 1967), but by the early 1980s, the profes-
sions had turned their attention to avoiding legal problems and in particu-
2 The articles were collected by the ﬁrst author as part of her larger project on organi-
zations’ EEO practices. An undergraduate assistant searched all issues of 10 major
professional personnel journals during 1964–89 and identiﬁed articles addressing
grievance procedures. For this study, we chose the articles that addressed grievance
procedures in the context of EEO law.
3 Although some are written about the value of general grievance procedures applied
to EEO matters rather than about EEO grievance procedures speciﬁcally, the quota-
tions below show the types of claims that members of the personnel, legal, and man-
agement professions make about the rationality of grievance procedures generally.
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lar to compliance with civil rights law. During this period, the articles
emphasize (and arguably inﬂate) the threat of civil rights lawsuits and
claim that organizations can substantially reduce both the number of such
lawsuits and the potential for liability should lawsuits occur by creating
internal grievance procedures. The articles generally hold that grievance
procedures reduce lawsuits and complaints to external agencies by resolv-
ing claims internally, reduce liability by demonstrating compliance, re-
duce discrimination by providing information and locating management
problems, reduce the appeal of unions by providing due process without
dues, and raise morale by giving employees voice.4
Two speciﬁc assertions about the legal value of grievance procedures
emerged during this period: ﬁrst, internal grievance procedures help to
resolve employee complaints so that employees would have no need to
ﬁle charges with external EEO agencies; and second, if external com-
plaints were ﬁled, courts would look favorably on organizations that had
taken steps to provide internal due process. The latter claim was made
most often in connection with discussions of sexual harassment claims.
For example, a 1981 article in Personnel, written by a lawyer and a man-
agement professor, begins with a blurb above the title stating, “Employers
can protect themselves against liability for sexual harassment charges
with a strong policy against such activity and a grievance procedure that
expedites the processing of such complaints” (Linenberger and Keaveny
1981, p. 60). The article goes on to state, “If the employer has no knowl-
edge of the harassment, liability can be avoided if two conditions have
been met: (1) The employer has a policy discouraging sexual harassment,
and the employee failed to use an existing grievance procedure; and (2) the
sexually harassing situations are rectiﬁed as soon as the employer becomes
aware of them” (Linenberger and Keaveny 1981, p. 60). In fact, as we
point out below, there was very little legal support for this argument in
1981.
The personnel journals emphasize the advantages of internal grievance
procedures for insulating organizations from liability, but they also sug-
gest internal beneﬁts: Grievance procedures provide a sense of justice to
employees and will therefore improve morale and productivity. David
Ewing, a managing editor of the Harvard Business Review, ties these
themes together in a 1982 article in that journal.
4 It is not just articles written about grievance procedures that emphasize their value.
Virtually all articles that address civil rights law or civil rights issues mention the
value of grievance procedures; moreover, we have never encountered an article that
recommends that employers not have a grievance procedure. Other forums, such as
commercial workshops on human resources issues and Web sites addressing human
resource audiences also frequently recommend the adoption of grievance procedures.
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An effective form of due process has various advantages for a company. It
helps to clear the air so that rumors of an abusive discharge or unfair han-
dling of an objector do not circulate and build up and sometimes, in the end,
create a worse situation than the original event. It is valuable for morale. . . .
Also, attorneys with whom I have talked believe that an in-company hear-
ing procedure can be helpful in case the employee objector takes the com-
pany to court; that is, evidence that an objector has been turned down in
a fair hearing will be admitted into a legal proceeding. (Ewing 1982, p. 121;
emphasis added)
Articles frequently emphasize the signiﬁcant cost savings available to or-
ganizations that institute internal grievance procedures. A 1984 article,
written by a lawyer and published in Management Review contains the
following advice: “A good grievance procedure keeps problems within the
company. It encourages fair treatment. Most importantly, it deters em-
ployees from seeking representation by outsiders—unions, government
agencies (like the EEOC or OSHA) or even lawyers. A problem settled
in-house can save tens of thousands in litigation costs” (Panken 1984, p.
42).
A 1985 article also points to the value of grievance procedures for
avoiding employee lawsuits in the ﬁrst place. The author, an investigative
reporter, writes,“If an employeecan get afair hearing through a grievance
system, there is less chance this employee will be tempted to go to the
courts” (Condon 1985, p. 72).
By the mid-1980s, then, the theme that grievance procedures could in-
ternalize disputes and gain favor with courts appears to be well estab-
lished in the professional literature. Grievance procedures had become
widely accepted as a rational form of compliance with civil rights law
and as a rational form of managing internal disputes. The question of
why the professions advocate particular solutions to legal problems is
an important one that we do not address directly in this article. But the
professions’ literature offers a number of explanations, including profes-
sions’ battles of jurisdictions (Abbott 1988; Larson 1977) and their
efforts to establish power within organizations (Pfeffer 1981; Edelman
et al. 1992).
Organizations’ Adoption of EEO Grievance Procedures
The rationalization of grievance procedures is not simply an artifact of
the personnel and legal professions; it is evidenced by the practices of
organizations as well. In this section, we use data from Edelman’s nation-
wide surveyof EEO practices, conductedin 1989,to examine the adoption
patterns of EEO grievance procedures (see Edelman [1992] for a discus-
sion of the sample and response rates). As shown in table 1, of 346 organi-
zations, 107 (31%) had created grievance procedures explicitly designed
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TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics on the Creation of Discrimination Grievance
Procedures
Government College Business Total
No. (%) of organizations creating speciﬁc
grievance procedures:*
Procedure .................................................... 22 (45) 22 (44) 63 (26) 107 (31)
No procedure ............................................. 27 (55) 28 (56) 184 (74) 239 (69)
Total ............................................................ 49 50 247 346
The creation of speciﬁc grievance proce-
dures by time period:†
Before 1970 ................................................ 2 (10) 2 (10) 10 (22) 14 (16)
1970–79 ....................................................... 11 (55) 11 (52) 11 (24) 33 (38)
1980–90† ..................................................... 7 (35) 8 (38) 24 (53) 39 (45)
Total ............................................................ 20 21 45 86
No. (%) of organizations creating speciﬁc
grievance procedures—mail sample
only:‡
Procedure .................................................... 16 (47) 15 (48) 29 (20) 60 (29)
No procedure ............................................. 18 (53) 16 (52) 113 (80) 147 (71)
Total ............................................................ 34 31 142 207
The creation of speciﬁc grievance proce-
dures by time period—mail sample
only:§
Before 1970 ................................................ 1 (6) 2 (13) 3 (13) 6 (11)
1970–79 ....................................................... 9 (56) 7 (47) 7 (29) 23 (42)
1980–89† ..................................................... 6 (38) 6 (40) 14 (58) 26 (47)
Total ............................................................ 16 15 24 55
* Between 1987 and 1990, 16 organizations created procedures. These organizations were coded as not
having a procedure in analyses predicting complaints in 1986.
† Dates of the creation of speciﬁc procedures were not available to 21 cases. For the event history
analyses, these cases are omitted.
‡ Between 1987 and 1990, 12 organizations created procedures. These organizations were coded as not
having a procedure in analyses predicting complaints in 1986.
§ Dates of the creation of speciﬁc procedures were not available for ﬁve cases. These cases are omitted
for the event history analyses.
to handle discrimination-related complaints by 1989. Of the 86 for which
creation dates were available, 14 (16%) were created before 1970, 33 (38%)
were created between 1970 and 1979, and 39 (45%) were created between
1980 and 1989.5
5 Fig. 1 also shows the creation patterns for the 207 organizations that responded to
the follow-up mail survey. The mail follow-up is discussed in more detail later in the
section on the myth of grievance procedures as insulators. Analyses of complaints
shown in later tables are based on the mail sample only.
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Figure 1 shows an integrated hazard plot, which illustrates the pattern
of adoption of these procedures over time.6 The plot shows little change
in the formation rate until about 1976, a time of relatively strong civil
rightsenforcement, andreﬂectsa rapid diffusion ofthesestructures during
the 1970s. The adoption rate remains fairly high during the 1980s despite
the weaker civil rights enforcement of the Reagan era. This suggests that
rational myths, as much as enforcement threats, were motivating the dif-
fusion process by this period. In fact, there appears to be a second burst
of EEO grievance procedure creation in the second half of the 1980s.
Why Is the Grievance Procedure Solution Attractive to Organizations?
Market-based approaches to organizational behavior would attribute the
evolution of EEO grievance procedures to the market efﬁciency of these
practices; like the personnel professionals, they would tend to see these
procedures as valuable for employee morale and for minimizing legal risk
(Thompson 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Williamson 1975). The insti-
tutional literature, however, would attribute the evolution of EEO griev-
ance procedures to the construction of rational myths or stories about the
rationality about these procedures (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott and
Meyer 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). One of the key features of ratio-
nal myths is that they appear so obvious that no one questions their verac-
ity; they just seem right.
Our contention is that these myths originate from models that have
already been institutionalized in other social arenas but that, over time,
they inﬂuence law and, hence, market forces. In the case of grievance
procedures, the institutionalized source of the myth is the legal order.
Grievance procedures appear rational because they look like the system
of appeals available in the public legal process, a basic and well-institu-
tionalized feature of a legitimate normative order (see Edelman 1990).
Since civil rights law is essentially a mandate of fair treatment for employ-
ees, regardless of race, sex, religion, or national origin, it seems only natu-
ral—and it is taken for granted—that grievance procedures, as the sym-
bolic embodiment of due process, would in fact provide fair treatment.
And therefore, it is taken for granted that the courts, society, and employ-
6 Integrated hazard functions provide a nonparametric estimate of the integral of the
hazard rate. Although the adoption rate is not directly observable, the hazard rate
can be calculated based on the proportion of organizations at risk of experiencing an
event at any given point in time that do in fact experience the event. The area under
the curve represents the cumulative probability that organizations will create EEO
grievance procedures. Changes in the slope of the center line reﬂect changes in the
rate of EEO grievance procedure creation. The upper and lower lines represent the
95% conﬁdence interval.
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ees would in fact recognize that grievance procedures constitute an effort
to comply with civil rights law.
Event-history analyses of the diffusion patterns of EEO grievance pro-
cedures show that, consistent with institutional theory, attributes of the
institutional environment rather than internal technical concerns drive
the diffusion of EEO grievance procedures (compare Edelman 1990, 1992;
Mezias 1990; Sutton et al. 1994). These analyses (shown in the appendix)
reveal that, consistent with institutional theory, organizations with the
highest rates of EEO grievance procedure creation were those closest to
the public sphere (both government organizations and colleges are more
than twice as likely as business organizations to create EEO grievance
procedures). Furthermore, organizations with afﬁrmative action ofﬁces
were more likely to create EEO grievance procedures than those without,
suggesting that these ofﬁces availed themselves of the professional litera-
ture recommending internal grievance procedures. Thus, the event-his-
tory analyses, which show a diffusion of grievance procedures, support
our argument that there was a gradual institutionalization of the “rational
myth” that internal grievance procedures would insulate organizations
from their legal environments.
But how do we know that the “rational myths” circulated by the person-
nel profession, and apparently adopted by organizations, are not in fact
“reality”? If EEO grievance procedures in fact produce efﬁciency beneﬁts
for organizations, then market-based theories would be largely correct.
To answer this question, it is ﬁrst worth noting that many of the claims
we found in the personnel journals were based on generalizations from
the experience of single personnel managers, or simply on suppositions.7
As a result, it is impossible to trace the authority for these statements or
to determine whether they are well-founded (see Galanter 1983, 1994).8
7 As found in a study of the professional construction of wrongful discharge (Edelman
et al. 1992), it is quite common for such claims to lack any references to those studies
or authorities backing up their conclusions. Consider the following 1985 article by an
associate editor of Personnel, published by a division of the American Management
Association: “According to recent surveys, the number of lawsuits initiated against
ﬁrms by former or current employees [has] been steadily increasing over the past few
years, along with the number of organizations that have instituted formal grievance
procedures fornonunion workers. There aregood reasonsfor organizationsto institute
these procedures: (1) to ensure fair treatment of employees across the board, (2) to
raise morale in the workplace, and (3) to avoid costly court litigation” (Lo Bosco 1985,
p. 61). Following the standard practices of journals of this type, this article provides
no references to these “recent surveys,” and we were unable to ﬁnd any.
8 In an article on discourse about lawyers, Galanter (1994, p. 664) calls attention to
“a series of factoids or macro-anecdotes about litigation [that] became the received
wisdom.” Galanter (1983, p. 61) argues that knowledge “is not the mechanical record-
ing of something out there—it is an interpretation of what we encounter, informed
by our hopes and fears and by our pictures of how the world is.”
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Although we do not maintain that the claims of the professions are
entirely wrong, we suggest that the professions’ arguments often have
little factual basis and are sometimes greatly exaggerated. We base our
argument on an empirical examination of the two common claims in the
personnel literature: First, that organizations with internal grievance pro-
cedures will experience fewer claims to external EEO agencies; and sec-
ond, that courts will be less likely to ﬁnd organizations in violation of civil
rights law if they have an internal grievance procedure in place. The next
two sections show that these claims were largely myth at the time they
were formulated. In that sense, they provide evidence for institutional
accounts of rationality. But we also show that over time certain economic
beneﬁts begin to accrue to organizations that adopt these procedures.
Thus, EEO grievance procedures turn out to have some market-based
rationality, although that rationality is socially constructed.
THE MYTH OF GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES AS INSULATORS
As exempliﬁed in the articles discussed above, a major appeal of EEO
grievance procedures is their perceived capacity to internalize complaints,
thus buffering the organization from complaints to external agencies and
from lawsuits. To test this claim, we measure organizations’ propensity
to elicit both external and internal complaints, focusing in particular on
the effects ofEEO grievance procedures. We consider threeways in which
the presence of EEO grievance procedures may affect the volume of dis-
crimination complaints.
First, if special EEO grievance procedures reduce the likelihood of law-
suits, they must reduce the likelihood of complaints to external fair em-
ployment agencies, which employees must ﬁle as a ﬁrst step in pursuing
theirstatutory rightsunder Title VII and severalother civil rightsstatutes.
Thus, one measure of the efﬁcacy of special EEO grievance procedures
is their impact on the number of external complaints.
Second, the presence of an internal grievance procedure may in fact
generate complaints that would not have been voiced were external com-
plaint forums the only option. EEO grievance procedures may generate
internal complaints by providing an alternative forum, which employees
may see as less expensive, more accessible, or less likely to result in retalia-
tion than external forums. Thus, the second effect of EEO grievance pro-
cedures we consider is the effect of those procedures on the overall number
of internal complaints.
Third, EEO grievance procedures may also generate external com-
plaints by making employees more aware of their rights or by encouraging
internal complaints but then failing to provide satisfactory resolutions.
This may motivate employees to ﬁle external complaints where they
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would not have done so otherwise. To fully understand the dynamics of
internal grievance procedures, then, it is necessary to assess the likelihood
that complaints will be internalized, controlling for the overall volume of
complaints. Thus, for our third measure of the efﬁcacy of EEO grievance
procedures, we estimate the effects of EEO grievance procedures on the
ratio of internal to total complaints. This “internalization ratio” may rep-
resent the diversion of complaints from the external legal system. Alterna-
tively, it may simply reﬂect an increase in different types of complaints,
which employees are more likely to pursue in internal forums.
Some of the effects of a specialEEO grievance procedure on the volume
of internal and external complaints, and on the internalization ratio, may
be inﬂuenced (or supplanted) by a general internal grievance procedure
(i.e., one that is not speciﬁcally designated for discrimination-related com-
plaints). Although we speciﬁed models estimating the effects of general
grievance procedures as well, in this article we focus on special EEO
grievanceprocedures because we expectthatmuch of theimpact ofspecial
EEO grievance procedures is due to their symbolic rather than their func-
tional value. Special EEO grievance procedures tend to encourage inter-
nal vis-a `-vis external complaints because they signal a commitment to fair
treatment and to the resolution of discontent.
The volume of discrimination complaints is, of course, likely to be a
function of a number of factors other than whether there is an EEO griev-
ance procedure in place. Indeed, since employees are likely to be respon-
sive to their employers’ symbolic actions (Fuller 1993) and to their institu-
tional environments, many of the factors that encourage responsiveness to
legal norms among managers may also motivate complaints and lawsuits.
Employees may be more likely tomobilize their rights in an organizational
culture that encourages attention to law than in a highly repressive or
discriminatory culture. Thus, we expect that factors that render organiza-
tions more sensitive to their legal environments (sector and contractor
status), and the presence of internal ofﬁces and staff that demonstrate
attention to civil rights law (EEO ofﬁces and the presence of an EEO
counselor), will increase the overall volume of complaints, both external
and internal. The presence of other internal structures is likely to be par-
ticularly important since these structures tend to generate agendas that
foster attention to EEO ideals (Edelman et al. 1991; Edelman and Petter-
son 1999). EEO ofﬁce staffs and counselors may develop commitments to
EEO goals and encourage employees to challenge discrimination (Edel-
man et al. 1991). Further, EEO ofﬁce staff and counselors are likely to
encourage the use of internal procedures because they believe in their ca-
pacity to reduce external complaints and lawsuits. Finally, internal coun-
selors increasingly see complaint resolution as a good management tech-
nique and may encourage the use of internal EEO grievance procedures
420Grievance Procedures
for that reason (Edelman, Erlanger, and Lande 1993). The percentage of
female and minority employees in an organization may also affect the
volume of complaints by altering the internal culture of the organizations.
A greater proportion of minorities and women increases employers’ op-
portunity for discrimination and may sensitize employees to their collec-
tive status and rights.
Another factor that would likely affect the volume of discrimination
complaints is, of course, the actual amount of discrimination in the organi-
zation. We do not have a direct measure of discrimination, and given legal
ambiguity as to what constitutes discrimination, it would indeed be quite
difﬁcult to ﬁnd one. Prior discrimination lawsuits could serve as a proxy
for discrimination. Just as complaints, however, prior lawsuits (which
must originate as external complaints) are likely to be a product of the
organization’s legal environment and internal legal culture. In addition,
organizations may change their behavior after being subject to a suit.
Thus, although we examine the effect of prior discrimination lawsuits on
complaints, we note that it is impossible to disentangle the possible expla-
nations for the observed effects. Perhaps a better proxy for discrimination
would be the sector and contractor status variables. Economists consis-
tently note greater responsiveness to civil rights law (measured by the
workforce shares of minorities andwomen) inthe public sector andamong
federal contractors (Leonard 1984, 1986; Heckman and Wolpin 1976). If
there is less actual discrimination closer to the public sphere, then one
would expect fewer discrimination complaints in those sectors. However,
if, as we suggest, the heightened responsiveness of organizations in these
sectors creates a culture more conducive to rights-consciousness, then one
would expect an increase in complaints in those sectors. Clearly, both fac-
tors may be at work, which could temper the observed differences in com-
plaint volume among the sectors.
Although the factors above are of primary interest, we also consider
the effects ofother organizational attributes that mayaffect organizations’
propensities to evoke complaints. We consider organizational size, since
larger organizations will produce more complaints. Organizational age
could affect complaints if organizational culture is imprinted at the time of
the organization’s birth. Professionalization may increase discrimination
complaints both because of a greater awareness of legal rights and greater
subjectivity in promotions and hiring. The presence of a personnel ofﬁce,
the number of attorneys who handle EEO matters, and the presence of
a union could also increase awareness of legal rights. Several other envi-
ronmental variables may also be relevant: in particular, we consider geo-
graphic region (South vs. other) and whether the organization is in a man-
ufacturing or service sector.
The data for these analyses come from a mail follow-up survey con-
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ducted as part of Edelman’s 1989 EEO survey.9 Approximately two-
thirds, or 207, of the original 346 respondents returned the mail question-
naire. The mail survey asked for data on internal and external complaints
for 1986. The year 1986 was chosen because it was sufﬁciently close to
the survey date to permit accurate recall, yet sufﬁciently prior to the sur-
vey for organizations to know whether external complaints had been ﬁled.
If organizations did not have data for 1986 but did know the number
of complaints for another recent year, they were asked to provide that
information instead, and a few organizations provided information for a
year before or after 1986.
These data clearly provide only rough indicators, especially with re-
spect to internal complaints, whereorganizationsmay havedifferent crite-
ria for recording a complaint. Further, any data on the timing of com-
plaints may be problematic because it is difﬁcult to know when
complaints, external or internal, will affect organizations. Employers and
personnel professionals may be aware of a developing case, for example,
long before any complaint is ﬁled. Or knowledge of one complaint may
lead to more informal complaints at lower levels of an organization, which
might not be ofﬁcially recorded. However, the data on the relative fre-
quency of internal and external complaints are, to our knowledge, unique
and provide an important indicator of a phenomenon that is both theoreti-
cally and socially important.10
Because the theoretical construct we measure is organizations’ propen-
sity to evoke complaints, we estimate maximum likelihood Tobit models.
Tobit analysis is appropriate where the dependent variable is censored at
some upper or lower bound as a result of the way the data are collected
(Winship and Mare 1992; Tobin 1958; Maddala 1983; Roncek 1992). In
our case, we have censoring at a lower bound: an organization’s propen-
sity to elicit complaints could be less than zero since an organization, given
9 The survey, Organizational Response to EEO/AA Law, was supported by a grant
from the National Science Foundation (SES 88–14070) and is described in appendix
A of Edelman (1992).
10 Five variables were missing information for 0.5%–7% of the sample. We created
missing data indicator variables (coded as “1” if missing, “0” if observed) for each of
these variables and recoded the original indicators to the variable mean (Little and
Rubin 1987). None of the missing value indicator variables are statistically signiﬁcant
in any of the models presented below, suggesting that organizations missing informa-
tion on these measures do not have different rates of complaints than organizations
with complete data. If the organization knew that it had a speciﬁc procedure, but did
not know the year it was created, we assume that the procedure was in place in 1986.
To test this assumption, we estimated models that included a dummy variable coded
“1” if the year was unknown and “0” if known. This coefﬁcient was also not signiﬁcant
and close to zero in magnitude.
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its environment, structure, and internal legal culture, may discourage
complaints as well as produce or encourage complaints. Since a majority
of the organizations experienced no complaints in the survey year, the
distribution of the dependent variables is skewed and least squares regres-
sion would produce biased and inconsistent estimates. We, of course, only
observe the portion of the distribution that is zero or greater.11 Thus, we
estimate models of the form:
1. Y * 1i 5 XiB 1 ei,
2. Y1i 5 Y * 1i if Y * 1i . 0,
3. Y1i 5 0i fY* 1i # 0,
where, for the ith observation, Y * 1i represents an organization’s propen-
sity to evoke complaints (the unobserved continuous latent variable), Y1i
represents observed complaints; Xi is a vector of values on the indepen-
dent variables, ei is the error, and B is a vector of coefﬁcients. We assume
that ei is uncorrelated with Xi and is independently and identically distrib-
uted (Winship and Mare 1992; Roncek 1992). Below we discuss Tobit
models predicting the volume of complaints to external agencies, internal
complaints, and the internalization ratio, in turn. Tobit coefﬁcients are
difﬁcult to interpret because they capture two types of effects in a single
estimate. We use Roncek’s method (1992; see also McDonald and Mofﬁtt
1980; Caspi et al. 1998) to partition these estimates into a component for
the change in the probability of experiencing a complaint (among cases
with zero complaints) and a component predicting the number of com-
plaints (among organizations with at least one complaint). Table 2 shows
the variables used in our analyses as well as descriptive statistics for those
variables.
The most direct measure of the buffering capacity of EEO grievance
procedures is their relationship to the volume of complaints to external
fair employment agencies. Table 3 shows a Tobit model predicting the
volume of complaints to these external agencies. To provide the strongest
test of the buffering hypothesis posited by the legal and personnel profes-
sions, we construct the EEO procedure indicator as a dummy variable,
coded “1” for organizations that have a speciﬁc EEO grievance procedure
and “0” for organizations that have either no procedure or a general griev-
11 The variable could also be conceptualized as a simple count, making Poisson regres-
sion the appropriate analysis technique. For all of our analyses, Poisson regression
produces similar results, albeit with coefﬁcients and t-values of greater magnitude.
We think the Tobit results are more realistic, and they are in any case more conserva-
tive. OLS regressions also produced similar results.
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Complaint Analysis: Variables, Descriptive Statistics, and Variable
Definitions
Phone
Variables Mail Mean Mean Description
Fixed independent variables:*
Business ................................ .71 (.45) .69 (.47) Private ﬁrm
College .................................. .14 (.35) .15 (.36) College or university
Government ......................... .14 (.35) .16 (.37) Government agency
Size ........................................ 7.03 (15.2) Employees in hundreds (1984)
Log size ................................ 5.57 (1.52) 5.58 (1.54) Natural log of full-time em-
ployees (1989)
%female ................................ .46 (.25) Percentage of full-time perma-
nent employees that are
women (1984)
%minority ............................ .17 (.19) Percentage of full-time employ-
ees that are members of ra-
cial or ethnic minority
groups
%salary ................................. .42 (.28) .41 (.28) Percentage of full-time employ-
ees that are salaried
South ..................................... .32 (.47) .32 (.47) “1” if South, “0” if other
Changing independent
variables:*
Contractor ............................ .35 (.48) .38 (.49) Federal contractor subject to
OFCCP regulation
EEO ofﬁce ........................... .17 (.38) .17 (.38) A separate department for
equal employment opportu-
nity or afﬁrmative action
Personnel .............................. .73 (.44) .72 (.45) Personnel department
Union .................................... .41 (.49) .44 (.50) Partially or fully unionized
Lawsuit ................................. .26 (.44) .27 (.44) Past suit for discrimination-
related complaint
Fixed dependent variables:*
Internal† ............................... 1.56 (3.25) Number of EEO-related com-
plaints ﬁled through the or-
ganization’s internal com-
plaint procedure (1986)
External† .............................. 1.41 (3.09) Number of EEO-related com-
plaints ﬁled with the EEOC
or state agency (1986)
Internalization ..................... .51 (.36) Ratio of internal to total com-
plaints (1986)
Changing dependent/indepen-
dent variable:*
EEO procedure ................... .27 (.44) .24 (.43) Speciﬁc equal employment op-
portunity grievance pro-
cedure
Note.—SDs are given in parentheses. N 5 206 for mail responses and 345 for phone responses.
* Fixed variables retain the same value in each period or are available for only one period. Changing
variables were collected as event histories and are coded “0” before the event occurs and “1” after the
event occurs.
† Four outliers were top-coded at 15 complaints. The internalization ratio is constructed from the
original, rather than the top-coded, complaint data. Two organizations that processed complaints for
other agencies were dropped from the analyses.Grievance Procedures
TABLE 3
Maximum Likelihood Tobit Regression of External Complaints
D in
D in Probability
Variable Coefﬁcient T-ratio Number (%)
Model 1:
Constant ................................... 24.57*** 23.75
EEO procedure ....................... .62 .63 .19 5
Size (hundreds) ........................ .17*** 6.85 .05 1
%female ................................... 1.04 .59 .32 8
%minority ................................ 3.72* 1.68 1.13 29
Government sector ................. .15 .12 .05 1
College sector .......................... 2.25 2.19 2.08 22
Contractor (business) .............. 1.92* 1.82 .58 15
Sigma ....................................... 4.87*** 11.40
Log-likelihood ......................... 2294.66
N ............................................... 205
Model 2:
Constant ................................... 26.21*** 24.27
EEO procedure ....................... 2.44 2.46 2.13 4
Size (hundreds) ........................ .12*** 4.95 .04 1
%female ................................... 1.19 .71 .36 10
%minority ................................ 2.64 1.24 .80 22
Government sector ................. 21.05 2.83 2.32 29
College sector .......................... 21.50 21.19 2.46 213
Contractor (business) .............. .88 .87 .27 7
EEO ofﬁce ............................... 3.10*** 2.86 .94 26
EEO counselor ........................ 2.40** 2.03 .73 10
Lawsuit .................................... 2.29** 2.48 .69 18
Sigma ....................................... 4.51*** 11.51
Log-likelihood ......................... 2284.52
N ............................................... 205
* P , .10.
** P , .05.
*** P , .01.
ance procedure. Model 1 shows EEO procedure and organizational and
sectoral control variables. In model 2, we add other EEO characteristics
that may affect an organization’s propensity to elicit complaints.
Table 3 shows that speciﬁc EEO grievance procedures have little effect
on the volume of complaints to external fair employment agencies. In
model 1, the coefﬁcient is close to zero and positive, and in model 2 the
coefﬁcient is close to zero and negative. This is the strongest evidence that
managers’ common beliefs in the buffering capacity of such procedures
are probably wrong. Without the additional EEO variables (model 1),
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only organizational size,12 the percentage minority, and government con-
tractor status have even marginally statistically signiﬁcant effects on the
volume of external complaints.13 Approximately 30% of the total effect of
each independent variable is on increasing or decreasing the number of
complaints among organizations that had at least one complaint, and
about 70% of the effect is on increasing or decreasing the probability of
experiencing a complaint among organizations that had no complaints.14
Among organizations with complaints, a 1,000-worker increase in full-
time employees corresponds to an additional one-half of one complaint;
among organizations without complaints, it corresponds to a 10% higher
probability of experiencing a complaint.
15 A 10% increase in the minority
workforce similarly corresponds to about one-tenth of one complaint
among organizations with complaints and raises the probability of experi-
encing a complaint by about 3%. Businesses with government contracts
were about 15% more likely to have a complaint and experienced about
0.6 more complaints than noncontractor businesses.
Including the additional EEO characteristics in model 2 signiﬁcantly
improves the ﬁt of the model and mediates the effects of the percentage
of minority employees and the contractor status. As expected, organiza-
tions with EEO ofﬁces and EEO counselors have a greater propensity to
elicit complaints since ofﬁces tend to call attention to civil rights and staff
12 We also estimated a series of models predicting the ratio of complaints to organiza-
tional size. Our substantive ﬁndings are robust under this speciﬁcation: EEO proce-
dures again fail to signiﬁcantly alter the level of complaints to external agencies.
13 Note thatthe sector variables (government and college) are not generally statistically
signiﬁcant in these analyses. These are key variables in institutional analyses and
are generally found to be statistically signiﬁcant in modeling diffusion processes (e.g.,
Edelman 1990, 1992). Their lack of signiﬁcance here suggests that vulnerability to
the institutional environment does not directly drive the complaint process.
14 We obtain these numbers using Roncek’s (1992) equation 4a for organizations with
at least one external complaint, B1 3 [1 2 (z 3 f(z)/F(z)) 2 f(z)2/F(z)2], where B1 is
the Tobit coefﬁcient for a particular independent variable, f(z) is the unit normal
density or the value of the derivative of the normal curve at z, F(z) is the cumulative
normal distribution function for the proportion of cases with at least one complaint,
z is the z-score associated with the area under the normal curve, and sigma is the
standard deviation of the error term in the estimated equation. For model 1 of table
3, B1 3 {12(2.3042).3807/.3805} 2 (.3807
2/.3805
2) 5 B1 3 .3033. For organizations
not experiencing complaints, the change in the cumulative probability of having a
complaint is B1 3 f(z)/sigma or B1 3 .0782 (from Roncek 1992, p. 504, eq. 4b).
15 We obtain these interpretations for organizations with complaints and without as
follows:
for size, B 5 .17 3 .3033 5 .05 per hundred (or .5/thousand) and .17 3 .0782 5 .013/
hundred or 13%/thousand; for percentage minority, B 5 3.72 3 .3033 5 1.13 (3.1)
5 .11 and 3.72 3 .0782 5 .29 (3.1) 5 3% per 10% increase; for contractor, B 5 1.92
3 .3033 5 .58 and 1.92 3 .0782 5 .15.
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may encourage employees to pursue those rights (Edelman et al. 1991).
Having an EEO ofﬁce increases the expected number of complaints by
almost one full complaint (3.1 3 .3033 5 .94) and raises the probability
of experiencing any complaint by 26% (3.1 3 .0844 5 .26). Having experi-
enced a previous discrimination-related lawsuit is also a strong predictor
of the volume of external complaints, increasing the expected number of
complaints by 0.7 and raising the probability of experiencing any com-
plaint by 18%. Asdiscussed above,thisprobably represents acombination
of the effectof complaints motivated bydiscrimination and theheightened
rights awareness that may accompany lawsuits.
A number of factors, found to have no statistically signiﬁcant effect,
are omitted from the estimated models shown in table 3. Other than orga-
nizational size and contractor status, which have the expected positive
effects on external complaints,16 organizational characteristics (age, pro-
fessionalization, and the presence of a union) have small nonsigniﬁcant
effects. Although preliminary analyses had shown the number of lawyers
employed by the organization to have a positive effect on the number of
external complaints, we omit this factor because we are unsure of the
temporal ordering of attorneys and complaints. Variables representing re-
gion, core/periphery, and manufacturing/service are not statistically sig-
niﬁcant.
In addition to their apparent inability to buffer organizations from ex-
ternal complaints, table 4 shows that EEO grievance procedures may in-
crease the volume of internal discrimination complaints. The effect of
EEO grievance procedures on internal complaints is statistically signiﬁ-
cant in model 1, but this effect is mediated by EEO ofﬁces, EEO counsel-
ors, and lawsuits in model 2. In model 1, having an EEO procedure in-
creases the expected number of complaints by more than one-half of one
complaint (2.15 3 .2976 5 .64) and raises the probability of experiencing
a complaint by 18% (2.15 3 .0821 5 .177). EEO counselors are especially
likely to channel employees toward internal forums, increasing the ex-
pected number of complaints in model 2 by 1.4 and raising the probability
of experiencing a complaint by 42%. Since EEO counselors often handle
discrimination complaints and problems, they are likely to be vested in the
internal resolution of complaints (Edelman et al. 1993). As with external
complaints, there is a marginally higher volume of internal complaints in
16 In organizational analysis, it is common to use the log of size rather than raw size
because it is generally the case that an increase in the size of a relatively small organi-
zation will have a greater effect on organizational structure than an increase in the
size of larger organization. In predicting the number of complaints, however, we do
not log size since every additional employee would appear to add an equal chance of a
discrimination complaint. We do represent the size variable in hundreds of employees,
however, so that the coefﬁcients provide more information.
427American Journal of Sociology
TABLE 4
Maximum Likelihood Tobit Regression of Internal Complaints
D in
D in Probability
Variable Coefﬁcient t-ratio Number (%)
Model 1:
Constant ................................... 24.66*** 24.03
EEO procedure ....................... 2.15** 2.35 .64 18
Size (hundreds) ........................ .19*** 8.35 .06 2
%female ................................... 2.69 2.41 2.21 26
%minority ................................ 5.55*** 2.65 1.65 46
Government sector ................. .82 .69 .24 7
College sector .......................... 1.95* 1.68 .58 16
Contractor (business) .............. 1.07 1.05 .32 9
Sigma ....................................... 4.60*** 11.09
Log-likelihood ......................... 2284.99
N ............................................... 205
Model 2:
Constant ................................... 28.15*** 24.88
EEO procedure ....................... 1.28 1.47 .38 12
Size (hundreds) ........................ .15*** 6.57 .05 1
%female ................................... 1.16 1.03 .35 10
%minority ................................ 4.88** 2.34 1.45 44
Government sector ................. .07 .05 .02 1
College sector .......................... 1.16 1.03 .35 10
Contractor (business) .............. .18 .19 .06 2
EEO ofﬁce ............................... 2.01** 2.00 .60 18
EEO counselor ........................ 4.69*** 3.38 1.40 42
Lawsuit .................................... 1.64* 1.88 .49 15
Sigma ....................................... 4.25*** 11.24
Log-likelihood ......................... 2272.22
N ............................................... 205
* P , .10.
** P , .05.
*** P , .01.
organizations that have experienced a prior discrimination-related law-
suit, suggesting effects of either greater discrimination or greater rights
awareness. As in the analysis of external complaints, only size and the
percentage of minority employees had a statistically signiﬁcant effect
among the other organization-level or sector-level variables.
The results presented so far, then, suggest that EEO grievance proce-
dures have relatively small effects on the volume of external and internal
complaints. However, their presence indirectly affects the volume of inter-
nal complaints because EEO ofﬁces and EEO counselors appear to en-
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courage their use. This raises the possibility that, controlling for the vol-
ume of total EEO complaints, speciﬁc EEO grievance procedures may be
associated with greater internalization of these complaints. By modeling
the internalization ratio, that is, the ratio of internal complaints to total
(internal and external) complaints, we determine the effect of EEO griev-
ance procedures and other organizational and environmental factors on
the internalization of complaints.
Because organizations must have experienced at least one complaint to
calculate the internalization ratio, there is a possibility of selectivity bias
in estimating the ratio; factors that affect whether organizations experi-
ence any complaints are likely to be associated with internalization. To
control for this possibility, we use Heckman’s (1976) selectivity approach
to model jointly the process generating any complaint and the process
generating the internalization of complaints.17 This is a generalization of
the Tobit model, in which Y * 2i, representing whether any complaints
are ﬁled, affects whether Y1i (the internalization ratio) is observed (see
Winship and Mare 1992). Thus, this model takes the form:
1. Y * 1i 5 XiB 1 ei,
2. Y1i 5 Y * 1i if Y * 2i . 0,
3. Y1i 5 0i fY* 2i # 0.
Table 5 shows the selection model predicting whether organizations
will have at least one complaint. This equation produces a coefﬁcient,
lambda, that we use to statistically adjust the internalization ratio equa-
tion for selectivity. Heckman’s method is most appropriate when there is
a determinant of the selection equation that can be excluded from the
substantive equation. One such exclusion is unionization: unionized orga-
nizations are more likely than nonunionized organizations to experience
complaints, but there is less reason to expect unionization to affect inter-
nalization.
18 Table 5 is also substantively relevant, showing that speciﬁc
17 For this part of the article, we would prefer to have information at the level of the
individual complaint rather than at the organizational level of analysis. Although we
can recover the proportion of internal to total complaints for each organization, data
on the type and fate of individual complaints would speak more directly to the efﬁcacy
of EEO grievance procedures and processes of internalization. In addition to the inter-
nalization ratio selection model discussed below, we also estimated nonratio models
predicting internal and external complaints using total complaints as a regressor. We
also speciﬁed ratio models with 1/total complaints (Gibbs and Firebaugh 1985, p. 717)
as a predictor and censored regression models with an upper limit of one and a lower
limit of zero. In each case, the substantive results with respect to EEO procedures
and counselors parallel those presented in table 6.
18 Since no exclusionary restriction is ideal, we also speciﬁed models omitting factors
such as organizational size, region, and industry from the substantive equation. When
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TABLE 5
Selection Equation Predicting Any Complaint
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coefﬁcient t-ratio Coefﬁcient t-ratio
Constant .......................................... 2.93*** 23.44 21.50*** 24.38
EEO procedure .............................. .66*** 2.67 .44* 1.65
Size (hundreds) ............................... .06*** 3.87 .04*** 2.69
%female .......................................... .09 .23 .06 .14
%minority ....................................... .65 1.29 .50 .95
Government sector ........................ 2.33 21.10 2.51 21.53
College sector ................................. .23 .29 .07 .23
Contractor........................................ .78*** 2.98 .66** 2.42
Union (business) ............................. .27 1.35 .29 1.38
EEO ofﬁce ...................................... .50 1.56
EEO counselor ............................... .83*** 3.08
Lawsuit ........................................... .28 1.39
Log-likelihood ................................ 2112.66 2104.87
N ...................................................... 205 205
* P , .10.
** P , .05.
*** P , .01.
EEO grievance procedures have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on the
likelihood that organizations will experience at least one discrimination
complaint. This is notable because many organizations that do not have
special EEO grievance procedures already have general grievance proce-
dures in place that could be used for discrimination complaints. Federal
contractors and organizations with EEO counselors are also more likely
to have at least one complaint. Not surprisingly, size is statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Table 6 shows models predicting the internalization ratio, ad-
justed for selectivity bias. EEO grievance procedures have a marginally
statistically signiﬁcant effect on internalization, standardized by overall
volume. Colleges,relative to private businesses, are particularly successful
at internalizing EEO complaints. EEO counselors also have a strong ef-
fect on the internalization ratio. There are several possible interpretations
of the effect of special EEO grievance procedures on the internalization
ratio. First, if these procedures exert a small negative effect on the volume
these models (which include unionization in both equations) are tested, the coefﬁcient
for unionization in the internalization ratio equation is close to zero (-0.05) with p-
values of approximately 0.5. Under these speciﬁcations, however, the models are less
stable and the overall ﬁt is worsened. The zero-order correlation is -0.008 between
unionization and internalization and 0.16 between unionization and any complaint.
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TABLE 6
Selection Equation Predicting Internalization Ratio
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coefﬁcient t-ratio Coefﬁcient t-ratio
Constant .......................................... .28 1.10 2.22 2.48
EEO procedure .............................. .21* 1.93 .19* 1.79
Size (hundreds) ............................... .004 1.04 .004 1.25
%female .......................................... 2.20 21.20 2.28* 21.67
%minority ....................................... .18 .82 .14 .62
Government sector ........................ .002 .02 2.02 2.17
College sector ................................. .17 1.54 .20* 1.67
Contractor (business) ..................... .06 .53 .06 .53
EEO ofﬁce ...................................... .04 .35
EEO counselor ............................... .52** 2.35
Lawsuit ........................................... 2.02 2.29
Selection correction ....................... .21 1.00 .33 1.23
Log-likelihood ................................ 228.49 223.85
N ...................................................... 205, 98 205, 99
R
2 ..................................................... .10 .15
* P , .10.
** P , .05.
*** P , .01.
of external complaints and asmall positive effect on the volumeof internal
complaints, the difference could produce a statistically signiﬁcant effect
on the internalization ratio. Second, if EEO ofﬁces and counselors drive
up the volume of total complaints, special EEO grievance procedures
could divert a portion of the excess volume to internal forums. Third,
and we think this is the most likely explanation, the presence of an EEO
grievance procedure together with the actions of EEO ofﬁces and EEO
counselors may motivate different types of complaints, which are more
likely to be pursued in internal forums. In particular, whereas external
forums are most likely to be used for claims involving discrimination in
hiring and ﬁring (Donahue and Siegelmann 1991), internal grievance pro-
cedures may be more likely to attract claims involving working conditions
and, in particular,sexual harassment. Thepositive (though nonsigniﬁcant)
value for the selection correction term suggests that organizations experi-
encing at least one complaint may possess unmeasured characteristics,
such as rights consciousness, for example, that are positively related to
internalization.
Taken together, the analyses summarized in tables 3–6 show that spe-
cial EEO grievance procedures generally fail to insulate organizations
from the threat of complaints to external fair-employment agencies. Addi-
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tional analyses (not shown) suggest that general grievance procedures also
had no insulating effect. Thus, many of the claims of the personnel, legal,
and management professions about the rationality of these procedures are
largely mythical. The presence of EEO grievance procedures is associated
with a greater propensity to elicit internal complaints, although it appears
to be EEO ofﬁces and EEO counselors, rather than the procedures them-
selves, that drive the volume (and possibly thenature) of these complaints.
Thus, EEO grievance procedures may play an important role in resolving
complaints within the ﬁrm, but they do not appear to protect organiza-
tions from experiencing external complaints or litigation.
THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL DEFERRAL TO GRIEVANCE
PROCEDURES
In this section, we examine the claims of the personnel and legal profes-
sions that courts will look favorably upon organizations with grievance
procedures. In particular, we examine evidence regarding the two major
assertions that we found in the personnel literature: (1) employers with
internal grievance procedures in place are less likely to be found in viola-
tion of civil rights law because the grievance procedures will serve as
evidence of fair treatment; and (2)if an employer has an internal grievance
procedure, courts may dismiss an employee’s lawsuit for failure to use
that grievance procedure.
These arguments had little legal foundation at the time that the person-
nel literature began to articulate them since virtually all discrimination
claims were at that time decided under a vicarious liability standard. Un-
der that standard, employers are held responsible for the wrongful acts
of their employees regardless of whether they knew about the wrong
doing. Thus, neither a policy against discrimination nor a grievance pro-
cedure would help an employer escape liability. Not surprisingly, few
cases prior to the mid-1980s even discussed the relevance of grievance
procedures.
In contrast to the assertions of articles such as those quoted earlier, the
vicarious liability standard applied to sexual (and also racial) harassment
cases as well as to discrimination cases through the mid-1980s. Since the
1964 Civil Rights Act did not explicitly prohibit sexual harassment, courts
had to decide whether it constituted sexual discrimination under the law.
Prior to 1986, courts were most responsive to allegations of quid pro quo
sexual harassment, in which supervisors demanded sexual favors as a con-
dition of employment or retaliated for denial of those favors. The judicial
position on the role of grievance procedures under the vicarious liability
standard is apparent, for example, in the federal court of appeals case of
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Miller v. Bank of America (600 F.2d 211 [1979]).19 In Miller v. Bank of
America, the plaintiff sued because she was ﬁred after refusing her super-
visor’s demand for sexual favors from a “black chick.” Bank of America
argued that it should not be liable because it had an established policy
against harassment and had afforded Ms. Miller an opportunity for re-
dress through its internal grievance procedure. Citing similar cases from
four other federal appellate circuits, the court held that, under the doctrine
of respondeat superior (a type of vicarious liability), employers are liable
for the acts of their agents (here, the supervisor) regardless of any policies
against those acts and regardless of the employer’s knowledge of those
acts. It held, moreover, that Title VII does not require employees to use
internal grievance procedures before ﬁling formal legal claims.20
19 There was some variation in the courts on the issue of vicarious liability at this
time. One federal district court held that an employer could not be held liable for the
sexual harassment of an employee by a supervisor unless there was an explicit com-
pany policy condoning the harassment (Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, 390 F.Supp. 161
[1975]). Another speciﬁcally rejected the logic in the Corne case and held that sexual
harassment by a supervisor was a violation of Title VII as a matter of law because
it created an artiﬁcial barrier to employment that burdened one gender but not the
other (Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. 654 [1976]). A third case treated the supervisor
as an agent of the employer, which meant that a policy or practice of a supervisor
constituted a policy or practice of the company under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior (Munford v. Barnes, 441 F.Supp. 459 [1977]). In Munford, the court arguably
raised the possibility that an employer could take some afﬁrmative action that would
insulate it from liability by suggesting that the employer was responsible because it
had not investigated the harassment even after it was given notice. But since then,
courts generally have a vicarious liability theory in quid pro quo cases, which means
that the employer is responsible whether or not the employer knew, should have
known, or approved of the supervisor’s actions (e.g., Anderson v. Methodist Evangeli-
cal Hospital, Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 [CA6 1972]).
20 Interestingly, the Linenberger and Keaveny article (1981) mentioned earlier cites
the Miller case in suggesting that grievance procedures would be valuable in litigation.
This may be based on a comment at the end of the case suggesting that the holding
will not put an undue burden on employers because, if the EEOC determines that
there is reasonable cause to believe that discrimination has occurred, it must allow
for conciliation. The court suggests that “an employer whose internal procedures
would have redressed the alleged discrimination can avoid litigation by employing
those procedures to remedy the discrimination upon receiving notice of the complaint
or during the conciliation period” (Miller v. Bank of America, 214). This does not
suggest, however, that if the case does eventually go to court, the court will be im-
pressed by the grievance procedure. The Linenberger and Keaveny article also refers
to the EEOC guidelines in making its claim. Here, ambiguity in the guidelines may
have contributed to the article’s claims. The ﬁrst guidelines on sexual harassment,
issued in 1980, state explicitly that employers are vicariously liable for the acts of
their agents. “Applying general Title VII principles, an employer . . . is responsible
for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment regardless of whether the speciﬁc acts complained of were authorized or
even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
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A new theory of sexual harassment—the hostile work environment the-
ory—began to evolve in the early 1980s (Hipp 1988). Under this theory, an
employee may sue because coworkers’ harassing acts make the workplace
intolerable for the plaintiff. Because this new type of sexual harassment
often involves harassment by coworkers rather than by supervisors, the
issue of agency is more problematic and thus the courts look for signs of
ratiﬁcation of the harassment by the employer rather than simply holding
the employer vicariously liable.
The hostile work environment theory was formally recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in the 1986 case of Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson (106 Sup. Ct. 2399 [1986]). The plaintiff, Michelle Vinson, al-
leged that her supervisor, Sidney Taylor, made repeated demands for sex-
ual relations, fondled her at work, and raped her on several occasions.
Vinson testiﬁed that she did not report Taylor’s behavior or use the com-
pany’s grievance procedure because of her fear of Taylor. Meritor Savings
Bank argued that because it did not know of any sexual misconduct by
Taylor, it could not be held responsible. In its review of the case, the court
of appeals used a vicarious liability standard and held that, irrespective
of the availability of the grievance procedure, the bank was liable for
Taylor’s conduct. The Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals,
recognizing the hostile environment cause of action and replacing the vi-
carious liability standard with a standard of direct liability in which only
employers who knew or should have known about the discriminatory acts
should have known of their occurrence” 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(c). However, the next
section is ambiguous and seemingly contradictory and suggests that an employer’s
subsequent actions may sometimes affect liability. “With respect to persons other than
those mentioned in paragraph (c) of this section, an employer is responsible for acts
of sexual harassment inthe workplace where the employer, orits agents or supervisory
employees, knows or should have known of the conduct. An employer may rebut
apparent liability for such acts by showing that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action” 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(d). One year later, paragraph (d) was revised
to state “With respect to conduct between fellow employees.” Thus, vicarious liability
would seem to apply only to supervisors and not to fellow employees. Finally, para-
graph (e) raises the issue of grievance resolution, although it suggests that employers
should inform employeesof their right to complain to the EEOC anddoes not mention
internal complaints. “Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harass-
ment. An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment from
occurring, such as afﬁrmatively raising the subject, expressing strong disapproval,
developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to raise and how
to raise the issue of harassment under Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize
all concerned” 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(e). The suggestion in the EEOC guidelines that
agency principles might sometimes apply, together with paragraph (e), which raises
the issue of employers’ responsibilities, may have led Linenberger and Keaveny (1981)
and others torecommend internal grievance procedures. Butnothingin the guidelines,
or any cases we were able to ﬁnd, speciﬁcally suggests that employers may avoid
liability by creating internal grievance procedures.
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of their agents are liable. With the adoption of the direct liability standard,
the earlier claims of personnel professionals suddenly gained validity since
employers could argue that their grievance procedures constituted evi-
dence that they sought to learn about and correct their agents’ misdeeds.
Though the court in the Meritor case held that the grievance procedure in
question was inadequate to insulate the employer from liability (because it
required the victim to complain directly to her alleged harasser), it noted
that in a future case, a better grievance procedure might provide such
insulation. “The bank’s grievance procedure apparently required an em-
ployee to complain ﬁrst to her supervisor, in this case Taylor. Since Taylor
was the alleged perpetrator, it is not altogether surprising that respondent
failed to invoke the procedure and report her grievance to him. Petition-
er’s contention that respondent’s failure should insulate it from liability
might be substantially stronger if its procedures were better calculated to
encourage victims of harassment to come forward” (Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 72–73).
Thus, although the court found the grievance procedure in question in
the Meritor case inadequate, it reinforced the personnel professions’
claims that grievance procedures may insulate employers from liability.
Almost immediately after that case was decided, a federal circuit court of
appeals adopted a similar standard in racial harassment cases (Hunter v.
Allis-Chalmers, 797 F.2d 1417 [1986]). Racial harassment cases are quite
similar to hostile work environment sexual harassment cases in that they
involve acts that may make the workplace intolerable for minorities but
do not necessarily involve direct threats to one’s economic welfare.
Further, a recent Supreme Court decision—Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton (118 Sup. Ct. 1115 [1998])—both reinforces the decision in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson on hostile environment sexual harassment and
gives credence to the personnel profession’s claim that employers may
avoid liability where they have an internal grievance procedure in place
and an employee fails to use it.
21 The court held, “While proof that an
employee failed to fulﬁll the . . . obligation of reasonable care to avoid
21 A concurring opinion in the Meritor case also suggested that an employee’s failure
to use an internal complaint procedure might render a court reluctant to ﬁnd that the
employee was constructively discharged, since the employee had waived an opportu-
nity to redress her grievance. The concurring opinion, written by Justice Marshall
and joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, would have retained the
vicarious liability standard but nonetheless suggests that an employer’s attempts to
redress grievances may be relevant to the issue of remedies. In this regard, the opinion
states that “where a complainant without good reason bypassed an internal complaint
procedure she knew to be effective, a court may be reluctant to ﬁnd constructive
termination and thus to award reinstatement or backpay” (Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 2399, 2411).
435American Journal of Sociology
harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any com-
plaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such fail-
ure will normally sufﬁce to satisfy the employer’s burden [of proof].”
The law on hostile environment sexual harassment cases since 1986
(and to an even greater extent in 1998), then, very much ﬁts with the
claims made by the personnel profession in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
But the law on virtually all other types of discrimination claims remains
one of vicarious liability: an employer is responsible for the acts of its
agents irrespective of an internal grievance procedure. Even the law on
hostile environment sexual harassment claims, moreover, developed after
the personnel professions’ claims regarding the value of internal grievance
procedures, as they were presented in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It
would appear, then, that judicial recognition of grievance procedures did
not motivate personnel professionals’ claims and organizations’ creation
of grievance procedures but rather that the courts were following institu-
tionalized organizational practices. The only other explanation, which we
examine below, would be that the court in the Meritor case was recogniz-
ing a trend that had become well established in the lower courts. This
does not, however, appear to be the case.
To determine when the law began to recognize grievance procedures
as a source of protection for employers and the extent to which internal
grievance procedures insulate employers from legal liability, we con-
ducted a content analysis of all available federal Title VII cases involving
sexual or racial discrimination or harassment in which employers dis-
cussed “the grievance procedure defense”; that is, they asserted that they
should not be held liable for discrimination because they had a grievance
procedure in place.22
We searched the Westlaw federal case database for all cases from 1964
through 1997, which alleged sexual or racial discrimination or harassment
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and also addressed the rele-
vance of grievance procedures.
23 The search found a total of 477 cases,
none prior to 1970. Of these, 161 cases were excluded for one or more of
the following reasons: they were not Title VII cases (or the part of the
case addressing grievance procedures did not involve Title VII); they did
not in fact involve the grievance procedure defense; they did not involve
racial or sexual discrimination or harassment; or they were duplicate
cases. We also eliminated 177 cases that involved union grievance proce-
22 In most cases, the grievance procedure defense is asserted in combination with other
defenses against liability.
23 The search request, which was conducted for each year within the period 1964–98
within the federal case database, was “Title VII” & race racial sex! /P “grievance
procedure!”.
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dures, which tend to be decided by reference to collective bargaining
agreements and therefore cloud the issue of judicial deferral to organiza-
tional grievance procedures. This left us with 129 cases.
Westlaw is one of the two major on-line databases that are used by the
legal profession to discover precedent (the other is Lexis).24 Since attorneys
tend to rely heavily on on-line case reporters, these databases are the de
facto case law that inﬂuences judges, lawyers, and employers.25 Because
we only searched for cases that discussed grievance procedures, the data
do not speak to the question of what proportion of all discrimination cases
involve an employer’s claim that the grievance procedure should provide
insulation. The cases do tell us, however, when the grievance procedure
defense ﬁrst arose and when it has been successful in insulating employers
from Title VII civil rights complaints.
The variables we coded for the case analysis are shown in table 7. The
dependent variable of interest is whether a court deferred to an organiza-
tion’s internal grievance procedure. We coded deferral in two different
ways. We coded a case as involving a “theoretical deferral” where, in the
abstract (i.e., not considering the merits of the grievance procedure in that
particular case), the court stated that it would base its decision at least in
part on whether the organization had an internal grievance procedure.26
24 When a court renders an opinion, it may order that the opinion be published in
ofﬁcial case reporters; it may make the opinion generally available for public distribu-
tion but with the limitation that it is to be considered legally “unpublished” and thus
not cited as precedent; or it may simply ﬁle the opinion with the general public records
available at the court, in which case it generally does not appear in the ofﬁcial report-
ers or on-line databases. (On rare occasions an opinion may be “sealed” and not avail-
able to the public at all.) The Westlaw federal database is based on extensive efforts
to include all “published” and (legally) “unpublished” cases from federal courts. Since
in some cases a court allows the (legally) unpublished cases to appear on-line and not
in the reporters, the Westlaw database is more comprehensive than the reporters. In
addition, although the Westlaw database does not generally include cases where the
court simply ﬁles the opinion, occasionally even those cases will be included if a re-
quest is made and the court approves it.
25 To the extent that published cases are not representative of all cases, they tend to
overrepresent novel decisions and underrepresent established law. This might mean
that cases deferring to grievance procedures are somewhat overrepresented. On the
other hand, all cases involving hostile work environment claims in general, and griev-
ance procedures in particular, address novel issues and are therefore likely to be in-
cluded.
26 The coding instruction for theoretical deferral was: “In the abstract, the court would
be willing to be inﬂuenced by whether the organization has an internal grievance
procedure. This does not mean that the court would base its decision entirely on the
presence of internal grievance; rather it simply means that the internal grievance has
some degree of inﬂuence. Cases where the court says that the grievance procedure in
this case is inadequate (perhaps due to lack of notice or the complainant having to
complain to her supervisor) may still be coded as theoretical defers if the court would
have deferred without those deﬁciencies in the grievance procedure.”
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TABLE 7
Case Analysis: Variables, Descriptive Statistics, and Variable Definitions
Mean SD Description
Theoretical defer ........... .87 .340 “1” if court would consider deferring to an
organization’s grievance procedure,
“0” if other
Actual defer ................... .36 .481 “1” if court deferred to an organization’s
grievance procedure, “0” if other
Theoretical quality ....... .81 .400 “1” if the court held that the quality of an
organization’s grievance procedure
ought to affect the court’s decision to
defer, “0” if other
Actual quality ............... .60 .491 “1” if the court’s decision with respect to
deferral depended in part on the qual-
ity of the organization’s grievance pro-
cedure, “0” if other
Direct liability ............... .481 .502 “1” if case alleges either race harassment,
or hostile work environment–only sex
harassment, “0” if other
Meritor cited ................. .29 .458 “1” if Meritor cited as precedent in the
opinion, “0” if other
Year ................................ 92.2 5.151 Year of court decision
Note.—N 5 129.
We coded a case as involving an “actual deferral” where the court ruled
in favor of the employer, in part based on the presence of an internal
grievance procedure.27 All cases involving actual deferrals must also in-
volve theoretical deferrals, but the reverse is not true. The Meritor case,
for example, involves atheoretical deferral but not an actual deferral since
the court said that the grievance procedure in that case was deﬁcient but
that a better grievance procedure might have insulated the employer from
liability (Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 72–73).
The independent variables we use in the analyses include the year of
the decision, whether the case was in a class where the direct liability
standard is generally used (i.e., racial harassment and hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment cases), whether the Meritor decision was ex-
27 The coding instruction for actual deferral was: The court ruled in favor of the em-
ployer, in part based on the presence of a grievance procedure. This does not mean
that the court based its decision entirely on the presence of internal grievance; rather
it simply means that the internal grievance had some degree of inﬂuence. It includes
cases where the court was inﬂuenced by the complainant’s failure to use a grievance
procedure.
438Grievance Procedures
TABLE 8
Cases Discussing the Grievance Procedure Defense
1980–86 1986–97
(before (after
Total 1974–79 Meritor)* Meritor)*
Period (%) (%) (%) (%)
No theoretical defer ........... 17 (13) 3 (75) 4 (44) 10 (9)
Theoretical defer ................. 112 (87) 1 (25) 5 (56) 106 (91)
No actual defer ................... 83 (64) 4 (100) 5 (56) 74 (64)
Actual defer ......................... 46 (36) 0 (0) 4 (44) 42 (36)
Total cases ........................... 129 4 9 116
* Three pre-Meritor 1986 cases are included in the second period. Meritor and one post-Meritor 1986
case are included in the third period.
plicitly cited as precedent, and two variables measuring the court’s stance
toward the quality of the grievance procedure. The “theoretical quality”
variable measures whether the court mentions in its decision that the
grievance procedure should provide employees with an adequate and fair
means of complaining. The “actual quality” variable means that the court
based its decision in part on the quality (or lack thereof) of the grievance
procedure in that particular case.
The 129 cases in which employers discussed the grievance procedure
defense ranged over the period 1974–97. Our analysis indicates that Mer-
itor Savings Bank v. Vinson has legitimated the grievance procedure de-
fense. Since that case, many more employers raise the grievance procedure
defense, and courts are far more predisposed to listen. As shown in table
8, the Westlaw federal database includes only 13 employment cases prior
to Meritor in which the grievance procedure defense was even raised. Of
those cases, there were six theoretical deferrals, four of which were also
actual deferrals. All of the actual deferrals prior to the Meritor case were
decided between 1980 and 1986. Although it is possible that these six cases
were responsible for the claims of the personnel profession during the
1980s, it is unlikely since all were district court cases, which receive little
publicity.28 None of the six cases were cited in the personnel literature.
Further, two of the six were not decided until 1986, although prior to
Meritor.
Table 8 shows that, in contrast to the very small number of cases (13)
28 One of those cases was the district court case that eventually led to the Supreme
Court decision in Meritor (Vinson v. Taylor, 1980 Westlaw 100). The only case prior
to 1980 was Munford v. James T. Barnes, 441 F.Supp. 459, which was decided in
1977.
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addressing the grievance procedure defense prior to Meritor, there are 116
cases after Meritor that raise the grievance procedure defense. Nearly all
of the post-Meritor cases (106, or 91%) involve theoretical deferrals.29 Of
those 106 cases, 42 (36%) involved actual deferrals. The high percentage
of post-Meritor theoretical deferrals is particularly striking. The high per-
centage of post-Meritor deferrals, in part, reﬂects the increase in the num-
ber of hostile work environment sexual harassment cases, in which courts
are the most likely to use the direct liability standard and therefore recog-
nize the possibility of deferring to internal grievance procedures. Signiﬁ-
cantly, the rise in the number of hostile environment cases and judicial
deferrals is itself endogenous. As plaintiffs and their lawyers bring actions
in evolving areas of the law, employers and theirlawyers frame their argu-
ments so that courts will be likely to defer to their internal grievance pro-
cedures. These numbers strongly suggest that Meritor has encouraged em-
ployers and their lawyers to raise the grievance procedure defense.
Figure 2 complements table 8 by showing continuous-time trends for
cases involving actual and theoretical deferrals in comparison to cases not
involving a deferral. The ﬁgure shows that the number of cases addressing
the grievance procedure defense is quite low until 1986 and then begins
to rise. Theoretical deferrals begin to take off in the late 1980s, after the
Meritor decision, and actual deferrals begin rising about four years later,
reﬂecting the gradual institutionalization of the grievance procedure de-
fense.
We next conducted a logistic regression analysis to examine how the
year of the case, the type of case, judicial attention to grievance proce-
dures, and the Meritor precedent combined to affect the likelihood of de-
ferral. Because nearly all the cases after Meritor involve theoretical de-
ferrals, and because the actual deferral variable provides a better measure
29 The following case provides an example of theoretical and actual judicial deferral
to organizational grievance procedures. In a 1992 federal district court case, Giordano
v. Paterson College of New Jersey (804 F.Supp. 637 [1992]), a female campus police
ofﬁcer had ﬁled both formal and informal complaints of sexual harassment naming
three male coworkers. The afﬁrmative action ofﬁcer found “inappropriate behavior”
but no sexual harassment. The ofﬁcer recommended that all department employees
attend a sexual harassment workshop, but the lawsuit alleges that the harassment
continued, eventually causing the employee to quit her job. She ﬁled suit for sexual
harassment based on a hostile environment. The court held that “theCollege promptly
and adequately responded to Giordano’s complaints. As a result the College cannot
be liable for sexual harassment based on a hostile environment claim” (Giordano v.
Paterson College of New Jersey, 644). Thus, the court granted the employer’s motion
for summary judgement, essentially deciding that because the employer had a griev-
ance procedure,the employeeﬁled a grievance, andthe employertook some action, the
employer won asa matter of law—thecase should not go to a juryfordetermination of
whether the response of the college was adequate.
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of the success of the grievance procedure defense, we use actualdeferral as
the dependent variable. And we use actual quality rather than theoretical
quality as an independent variable since that variable better captures ju-
dicial attention to the quality of an organization’s grievance procedure.
Table 9 shows logit models predicting the log-likelihood of courts’ actual
deferrals to internal grievance procedures. Models 1 and 2 show the likeli-
hood of judicial deferral for all cases in the sample; these models use only
the year and actual quality variables. Models 3 and 4 show the likelihood
of judicial deferral for post-Meritor cases only; for these models, we add
the direct liability and Meritor cited variables, which are applicable only
after Meritor.
Model 1, the basic model, shows a statistically signiﬁcant positive effect
of time on the likelihood of actual deferrals, which suggests that courts are
becoming increasingly likely to defer to internal organizational grievance
procedures in making decisions about liability. This is the critical model
supporting our argument about endogeneity: courts are accepting—and
reinforcing—stories about the rationality and legality of organizational
grievance procedures.
Models 2–4 provide additional information about this time trend by
identifying the types of cases in which deferrals are most likely to occur.
Model 2, which still applies to the entire sample, shows that in making
these decisions courts are paying (at least some) attention to the quality
of internal grievance procedures. Although courts are unlikely to have
knowledge about the key ways in which internal organizational grievance
procedures differ from legal forums (Edelman et al. 1993), this ﬁnding
suggests that courts at least attempt to follow Meritor’s guidance that
poor or sham grievance procedures cannot offer protection to employers.
Model 3 replicates model 2 for the post-Meritor cases only, and model
4 adds direct liability and whether Meritor is cited to the model. In the
post-Meritor years, the year variable is statistically signiﬁcant even with
the control variables, suggesting a continuing institutionalization of
courts’ tendency to defer to internal organizational grievance procedures.
Judicial attention to the quality of the internal grievance procedure also
signiﬁcantly predicts actual deferrals.30
Model 4 adds the direct liability variable, which measures whether the
case was a hostile work environment or racial harassment case, in which
30 Cross-tabulations reveal that of the 78 cases where courts paid attention to the qual-
ity of the grievance procedure, there were 41 actual deferrals, whereas out of the 51
cases in which quality was not considered, there were only ﬁve actual deferrals. More-
over, all of those 41 deferrals were in cases where courts found the grievance proce-
dures to be good. Since the courts’ views of the quality of the grievance procedure
were perfectly correlatedwithdeferral, wecouldnot use avariable measuringwhether
actual quality was considered and found to be good in the logit analyses.
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the direct liability standard applies (as opposed to a discrimination case
or a quid pro quo sexual harassment case in which the vicarious liability
standard applies). From a legal standpoint, only the direct liability stan-
dard gives courts the option of deferring to organizational grievance pro-
cedures since the vicarious liability standard holds that employers are lia-
ble for the acts of their agents irrespective of their knowledge of those
acts. The variable attains only borderline statistical signiﬁcance, sug-
gesting that while deferrals are more likely in cases using the direct liabil-
ity standard, this variable does not completely explain the time trend. The
result must be interpreted with caution, however, because it was not clear
whether the direct liability standard was used in sexual harassment cases
involving mixed hostile work environment and quid pro quo claims.31
The Meritor-cited variable is negative, as expected, but not statistically
signiﬁcant. Thus, courts that cite Meritor are not signiﬁcantly less likely
to defer to organizational grievance procedures when attention to the
quality of the grievance procedure is statistically controlled. This makes
sense, since courts are likely to cite Meritor when they pay attention to
the quality of the grievance procedure, whether or not they ﬁnd it of sufﬁ-
ciently good quality to support a deferral.
Overall, tables 8 and 9 support our contention that judicial deferral to
organizational grievance procedures takes place primarily in the 1990s,
quite a few years after the personnel profession’s initial claims of the value
of internal grievance procedures. Further, although courts’ recent tenden-
cies to defer to internal grievance procedures can be explained in part by
the introduction of direct liability principles into employment law, this
does not mean that the law alone explains the new “truth” to the personnel
professions’ claims about the value of internal grievance procedures.
There is nothing about direct liability principles that requires courts to
defer to internal grievance procedures. Rather, those principles simply say
that an employer who knew, or should have known, or approved of the
acts of an agent may be held responsible. While the conceptual leap from
direct liability theory to the relevance of organizational grievance proce-
dures is not a huge one, it was greatly facilitated by the institutionalization
of nonunion grievance procedures in organizations. That institutionaliza-
tion, itself a response to the personnel professions’ assumptions and claims
about law, made grievance procedures seem like the most rational—and
indeed the most natural mode—by which employers ought to ﬁnd out
about problems within their organizations.
31 There were actual deferrals in only two cases that were quid pro quo–only cases
and thus clearly used the vicarious liability standard. In cases involving both quid
pro quo and hostile environment claims, it was often not clear whether the court used
the direct or vicarious liability standard; we coded these cases “0” on the direct liability
dummy variable.
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The ﬂexibility and ambiguity inherent in the agency principle is evident
in a passage from the Meritor opinion, in which the court relies on an
amicus curiae brief of the EEOC, stating:
If the employer has an expressed policy against sexual harassment and has
implemented a procedure speciﬁcally designed to resolve sexual harassment
claims, and if the victim does not take advantage of that procedure, the
employer should be shielded from liability absent actual knowledge of the
sexually hostile environment (obtained, e.g., by the ﬁling of a charge with
the EEOC or a comparable state agency). In all other cases, the employer
will be liable if it has actual knowledge of the harassment or if, considering
all the facts of the case, the victim in question had no reasonably available
avenue for making his or her complaint known to appropriate management
ofﬁcials. (Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 26; citing brief for United States
and EEOC as amici curiae)
That the EEOC must make a case for how agency principles should be
interpreted in the context of hostile environment cases—and that Meritor
cites the EEOC brief in its opinion on what agency principles mean—
show that there agency principles do not require courts to defer to internal
grievance procedures. Instead, employers like Meritor Savings Bank raise
the grievance proceduredefense because of the institutionalized belief that
grievance procedures constitute fair treatment and that they may insulate
employers from liability. Both the EEOC and the Meritor court move
from the legal language involving agency principles to the importance
of organizational policies and grievance procedures because of the same
institutionalized beliefs. In this way, organizational policies and practices
inﬂuence the construction of law in organizational settings. Courts give
weight to organizational grievance procedures because ideologies of ratio-
nality suggest that these procedures constitute a reasonable alternative to
litigation.
RATIONAL MYTHS AND THE ENDOGENEITY OF LEGAL
REGULATION
To unravel the endogeneity of legal regulation, we have examined the
rationalization of grievance procedures with data from the professional
personnel literature, the courts, and a national sample of organizations.
Over the past 30 years, EEO grievance procedures have become a stan-
dard and rationalized form of compliance with EEO law. The grievance
procedure example illustrates the argument that ambiguous law generates
strategic attempts at rational compliance, which cannot be viewed apart
from institutionally constructed belief systems. The professions, inﬂu-
enced by the public legal order, construct stories about what forms of
compliance will minimize interference by legal institutions. Strategically,
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rational organizations adopt these structures but often inject managerial
goals into the legal form to make it better ﬁt their objectives (Edelman
et al. 1993).
Our analyses of the impact of organizational grievance procedures on
legal complaints, and of judicial trends in deferring to organizational
grievance procedures, show that the claims made by the personnel profes-
sion regarding the insulating power of grievance procedures were largely
unfounded at the time they were made. Organizational grievance proce-
dures appear to have no impact on the number of complaints to legal
agencies and in fact increase the number of internal complaints. They
may result in diversion of complaints from external to internal forums
but probably only because EEO ofﬁces present in the same organization
encourage employees to ﬁle more complaints and different types of com-
plaints internally.
In addition, organizational grievance procedures had little legal value
until recently and then primarily in cases where the direct liability stan-
dard has been adopted. Thus, the stories that the personnel profession
created anddisseminated about the rationalityof organizational grievance
procedures were not unreasonable ones; it took only small leaps in legal
logic to believe that grievance procedures could provide insulation from
the legal environment. But in fact, there was almost no basis in the law
for these claims. It seems likely that the personnel professionals who were
publishing on the topic simply “knew” the value of grievance proce-
dures—because grievance procedures have been legitimated in organiza-
tional and socio-legal ﬁelds as institutions of legality and justice. Further,
because the professions act as carriers of important information about
the legal environment (Edelman 1992), organizations adopted grievance
procedures without serious review of these claims.
The ﬁctive status of these rational myths has now begun to change,
however, because courts—as part of the same organizational and socio-
legal ﬁelds—are inﬂuenced by the same set of institutionalized beliefs as
other organizations (Edelman, in press). And as courts begin to legitimate
grievance procedures, the professions also step up their message.32 Even
since Meritor, the professions appear to construct straightforward stories
about the rationality of grievance procedures, rather than delving into the
32 Advice on the value of grievance procedures is not conﬁned, moreover, to profes-
sional personnel journals or books; it is easily found on numerous sites on the World
Wide Web. The Workforce Online site, for example, has a page titled “Minimize Risk
by Investigating Complaints Promptly.” The site advises employers that “Recent
wrongful discharge and sexual harassment verdicts underscore an employer’s liability
for failing to provide for an effective means to resolve sexual and other harassment
issues in the workplace. . . . To avoid such risks, employers must develop and imple-
ment an effective method for employees to raise sexual harassment complaints.”
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complexitiesandcontradictionsinthecourtdecisions.Forexample,Alfred
Feliu,shortlyaftertheMeritordecision,wrote,“Theexistenceofaninternal
system enhances both the appearance and reality of fairness of the com-
pany’s actions in a later court proceeding. . . . The [Meritor] Court viewed
the existence of an effective internal complaint procedure as a positive—
and possibly dispositive—factor in defense of sexual harassment (and pre-
sumably other discrimination) claims” (Feliu 1987, pp. 91–92).
The Feliu quote, which appeared just after Meritor was decided, over-
states the legal value of grievance procedures by suggesting that grievance
procedures may be a “dispositive” factor in sexual harassment cases and
“presumably in other discrimination cases,” when in fact it is almost never
dispositive and (even today) would probably not be an important factor
in other discrimination cases.
The grievance procedure example, then, highlights the endogeneity of
court decisions, professional norms, and organizational practices. Organi-
zations create grievance procedures as evidence of fair treatment, and the
professions make claims about the legal value of those procedures. As
those claims become institutionalized, forming ideologies of rationality,
courts recognize and construct the rationality of EEO grievance proce-
dures by holding that, under some circumstances, these procedures consti-
tute evidence of fair treatment and that employers may escape liability
by adhering to their (effective) grievance resolution procedures. The pro-
fessions, sometimes with greater enthusiasm than is perhaps warranted,
ﬁlter anddisseminate court decisions, whichreinforce andlegitimate orga-
nizations’ initial structural responses to law. And the circle closes as orga-
nizations continue and elaborate their responses.
Ofcourse,theorganizationalandlegaltreatmentofgrievanceprocedures
has developed in the context of a highly ambiguous, politically contested,
andweaklyenforcedsetoflaws.Hadthelawbeencleareraboutthemeaning
ofdiscrimination,orless politicallycontested,courtsmight deferless tothe
procedures and decisions of organizational actors. And, it may be the case
thatwhereexpectedenforcementisveryweak,organizationsmaynoteven
ﬁnditimportanttomakesymbolicgesturestoward—orattempttoinsulate
themselvesfrom—thelegalenvironment.Infact,thepatternofEEOgriev-
ance procedure adoptions we ﬁnd would be consistent with this argument
sinceveryfewproceduresappearuntiltheearly1970s,atimeatwhichEEO
enforcement became somewhat more stringent.
Although we have focused on the development of the grievance proce-
dure defense in Title VII actions, it is important to recognize that judicial
deferral to organizational dispute resolution forums is not limited to fed-
eral discrimination cases. A 1996 case involving wrongful discharge in
violation of an implied contract decided in the California court of appeals
(Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc., 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 129
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[1996]), for example, shows that judicial deferral to organizational forums
is also occurring in implied contract wrongful discharge cases in state
courts.33 The Cotran case is especially important because the court says
explicitly that the result of an internal hearing need not be correct as long
as the employer is acting in good faith. “To require an employer to be
‘right’ about the facts on which it bases its decision to terminate an em-
ployer is to interfere with the wide latitude an employer must have in
making independent, good faith judgements about high-ranking employ-
ees without the threat of a jury second-guessing its business judgement.
. . . Where, as here, we are dealing with charges of sexual harassment, we
believe the most we can reasonably ask of employers under these difﬁcult
circumstances is that they act responsibly and in good faith” (Cotran v.
Rollins Hudig Hall International, Inc., 139–40).
Courts also defer, under some circumstances, to mandatory arbitration
clauses. In 1991, the United States Supreme Court upheld arbitration
clauses under the Federal Arbitration Act in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
LaneCorp.(111Sup.Ct.1647[1991]).Thecourtheldthatarbitrationwasno
longerjustaprivatemeansofresolvingdisputesbetweenfreelycontracting
partiesbutalsoanalternativeforumforresolutionofpublicstatutoryrights.
Sincethen,amajorityofthefederalappellatecircuitshaveheldthatGilmer
extends to mandatory arbitration of discrimination claims under employ-
ment contracts, and many employers are inserting mandatory arbitration
clauses into employment contracts (Matthews 1997). And as in the case of
organizationalgrievanceprocedures,numerouspersonnelarticlesandWeb
sites tout the rationality of mandatory arbitration.
Legislatures are also in some sense deferring to organizational realms.
Both the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act encourage employers to establish or participate in forms of alternative
dispute resolution as a means of resolving complaints without resorting
to litigation.
From a policy standpoint, judicial deferral to organizations—and the
endogeneity of law generally—raises some concerns. Although Meritor
warned that courts should defer only to effective grievance procedures,
and our data suggest that many courts are heeding that warning, courts
33 Ralph Cotran was ﬁred from Rollins Hudig Hall for sexual harassment after two
women used an internal grievance procedure to ﬁle sexual harassment charges against
him and an internal investigation held that it was more likely than not that sexual
harassment had occurred. Cotran then ﬁled suit for wrongful termination claiming
that there was an implied contract that he be terminated only for good cause. The
jury in his wrongful termination suit found Cotran had not engaged in sexual harass-
ment and awarded him $1,783,549 for wrongful termination. The California court of
appeals, however, overturned the verdict, ﬁnding thatthe lower court should not have
overturned the ﬁndings of the organization’s internal grievance procedure.
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are not likely to be aware of the many ways in which internal grievance
forums may undermine legal rights. Even when employers have the best
of intentions, the lack of formal due process protections that characterize
internal grievance procedures, the different types of remedies offered by
those forums, and the tendency of organizational complaint handlers to
recast legal problems in managerial terms mean that legal rights are often
transformed in the organizational context (Edelman et al. 1993). Further,
employees may have good reasons for choosing not to use internal griev-
ance procedures; for example, they may be legitimately concerned about
biases of decision makers or retaliatory tactics of employers but may be
unable to demonstrate these problems to a court. To the extent that courts
defer to organizations without full awareness of the subtle pressures that
characterize theworkplace, legal idealsmay be compromised. Moregener-
ally, when courts adopt forms of compliance created within organizational
ﬁelds, they run the risk of institutionalizing the very forms of discrimina-
tion that laws were originally designed to alleviate.
From a theoretical standpoint, our analysis of grievance procedures
suggests an important corrective to the organizational literature on ratio-
nality. Although much of the literature debates whether rationality is
“real,” in the sense of providing market beneﬁts (e.g., Williamson 1975),
or socially constructed (e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977), our study suggests
that socially constructed rationality may over time produce market bene-
ﬁts as courts recognize and legitimate organizational practices and hold
that they may protect organizations from liability.
Our example also elaborates the socio-legal literature on the symbolic
nature of law (Edelman 1992; Stryker 1990, 1996) by illustrating how legal
rules function less as absolute mandates than as rhetorical claims that
acquire meaning through dialog across organizational, professional, and
legal ﬁelds. That dialog operates as ideologies of rationality evolve within
and ﬂow across those ﬁelds, inﬂuencing ideas of justice as well as efﬁ-
ciency. Developments within each ﬁeld spur reactions, interpretations,
normative declarations, ﬁltering processes, and organizational mimesis,
all of which interact to construct not only organizational responses to law
but the law itself.
APPENDIX
The Diffusion of EEO Grievance Procedures
Event-history models of the diffusion of EEO grievance procedures over
time suggest that organizations did in fact heed the warnings and advice
of the personnel profession. We estimated models of the form:
rp 5 apebx1lpzp,
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TABLE A1
Determinants of the Creation of Specific Grievance Procedures
Variables Coefﬁcient Antilog t-value
Time-independent variables:
Sector:
College ..................................... .75*** 2.12 2.75
Government (business) ........... .94** 2.56 2.17
Log size .................................... 1.47* 1.15 1.89
1964–76:
Constant ....................................... 26.63*** .001 211.81
Contractor ................................... .91** 2.49 2.05
EEO ofﬁce ................................... 1.24** 3.45 2.52
Lawsuit ........................................ 28.29 .0002 2.18
1977–79:
Constant ....................................... 24.92*** .007 29.31
Contractor ................................... .29 1.34 .51
EEO ofﬁce ................................... 1.18** 3.24 2.36
Lawsuit ........................................ 21.08 .34 21.36
1980–89:
Constant ....................................... 25.49*** .004 211.61
Contractor ................................... 2.39 .68 21.09
EEO ofﬁce ................................... .56 1.75 1.36
Lawsuit ........................................ .93** 2.54 2.54
* P , .10.
** P , .05.
*** P , .01.
whererp represents theformation ratefrom thestartingstate (nostructure)
to the ending state (the creation of an internal EEO procedure) during
period p; ap represents the constant term for period p; bx represents a
vector of explanatory variables with effects that are not dependent on
time period and their coefﬁcients; and lpzp represents a vector of time-
dependent explanatory variables and their coefﬁcients.34 Based on chi-
square likelihood ratio tests of various period speciﬁcations, we allow the
rate of procedure creation to vary across three historical periods: 1964–
74, 1975–79, and 1980–89.
Table A1 in the appendix shows an event-history model of the diffusion
of EEO grievance procedures. The coefﬁcients give the effect of the vari-
34 Event-history analysis is appropriate for modeling the sources of EEO grievance
procedure creation because legal environments exert continuous pressure on organiza-
tions (Tuma and Hannan 1984; Allison 1984; Carroll 1983). The dependent variable
is the rate of EEO grievance procedure creation, where the rate is deﬁned as “the
transitional probability over a unit of time where the unit is inﬁnitesimal” (Carroll
1983).
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able on the log of the rate of special grievance procedure formation, while
the antilogs of the coefﬁcients give the multipliers for the base rate, or the
relative risk of an EEO grievance procedure. The results for EEO griev-
ance procedures are consistent with earlier analyses of the diffusion of
institutional models, which addressed nonunion grievance procedures and
general grievance procedures (Edelman 1990; Sutton et al. 1994). Organi-
zational sector exerts a relatively strong effect on the rate of EEO griev-
ance procedure formation. Government organizations are almost twice as
likely as business organizations to create EEO grievance procedures, and
colleges are also somewhat more likely than businesses to create such pro-
cedures. Organizational size has a marginally statistically signiﬁcant effect
on EEO grievance procedure formation, which may represent the greater
visibility (Edelman 1992) or the greater ﬁnancial and technical resources
(Yeager 1991) of larger organizations.
During the ﬁrst time period, federal contractor status and the presence
of anEEO ofﬁcepredict EEO grievanceprocedureformation: both render
organizations far more sensitive to their legal environments, and EEO
ofﬁces provide a vehicle for the infusion of professional norms. Contractor
status is no longer statistically signiﬁcant during the 1980s, a period of
waning civil rights enforcement. During the later period, experiencing a
discrimination lawsuitis apositive predictor of EEO grievance procedure.
The late effect of lawsuits may suggest that lawsuits motivate organiza-
tions to adopt institutionalized symbolic structures; if lawsuits motivated
internal grievance procedures purely as a cost-reducing measure, one
would expect a positive effect in the earlier periods as well.
The event-history ﬁndings, then, show that factors rendering organiza-
tions more sensitive to their legal environments—proximity to the public
sphere, federal contractor status, the presenceof an EEO ofﬁce, and previ-
ous lawsuit experience—motivate a higher rate of EEO grievance proce-
dure formation, especially during the late 1960s and 1970s when those
procedures were spreading rapidly among organizations. These ﬁndings
suggest that institutional environments provide an important source of
ideas regarding the rationality of grievance procedures. The admonitions
and advice of the legal and personnel professions, discussed above, illus-
trate an important mechanism by which these environments operate.
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